

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 IO-10 ISO-00 FEAE-00 AEC-05 AF-06

ARA-06 CIAE-00 DODE-00 EA-06 PM-03 H-01 INR-07 L-02

NASA-01 NEA-09 NSAE-00 NSC-05 OIC-02 SP-02 PA-01

PRS-01 OES-03 SS-15 USIA-06 SAJ-01 /115 W

----- 082376

R 181722Z FEB 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 8085

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

USMISSION IAEA VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BONN 02753

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, TECH, GW

SUBJECT: GERMAN VIEWS ABOUT PNE'S

REF: A. BONN 02153, B. STATE 033966, C. STATE 237038,

D. STATE 156583 (AUG,1973), E. STATE 011247,

F. STATE 031756, G. USNATO 0178, H. BONN 12172

(AUG 1973), I. STATE 035203

1. SUMMARY: EMBASSY APPRECIATES DEPARTMENT'S TIMELY AND COMPREHENSIVE RESPONSE TO REF A. DURING DISCUSSION ON FEBRUARY 14, FRG DISARMAMENT COMMISSIONER ROTH PRESENTED GERMAN VIEWS ABOUT PNE'S IN NPT CONTEXT AND REVEALED SOME CONCERN ABOUT QATTARA DEPRESSION PROJECT IN EGYPT. HE URGED THAT NUCLEAR WEAPONS STATES (NWS) ACT PROMPTLY TO MEET THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER ARTICLE V OF THE NPT. HE FEARED THAT OPTIMISTIC REPORTS FROM US SOURCES ABOUT THE UTILITY OF PNE'S WOULD ENCOURAGE NON-NUCLEAR-WEAPONS STATES (NNWS) TO DEVELOP THEIR OWN PNE TECHNOLOGY IF INTERNATIONAL RULES AND PROCEDURES WERE FURTHER DELAYED. THE FRG SUPPORTED THE UK PROPOSAL FOR A PNE COMMITTEE IN THE
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IAEA AND HOPED FOR CONCRETE RESULTS. EMBASSY DREW ON

REFS B THROUGH G IN RESPONDING. ROTH PLANS TO VISIT US FEBRUARY 24-27 AND WOULD APPRECIATE OPPORTUNITY TO CONTINUE DISCUSSIONS. EMBASSY WILL OUTLINE ROTH'S VIEWS IN SOME DETAIL TO ASSIST PREPARATIONS FOR THESE TALKS. END SUMMARY.

2. THE FRG FAVORS THE UK PROPOSAL FOR A PNE COMMITTEE IN THE IAEA. ROTH EXPLAINED THAT THE FRG IS, IN FACT, MORE INTERESTED IN CONCRETE RESULTS FROM THIS INITIATIVE THAN THE UK ITSELF SEEMS TO BE. THE FRG BELIEVES THAT THE IAEA SHOULD DEVELOP RULES AND PROCEDURES FOR USE SHOULD PNE'S BECOME FEASIBLE FOR TWO MAIN REASONS:

- A. THE NPT ESTABLISHED ONLY A FEW OBLIGATIONS FOR THE NUCLEAR WEAPON STATES -- ONE OF THESE IS THE REQUIREMENT OF ARTICLE V. THE NWS SHOULD ACT PROMPTLY TO SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.
- B. SHOULD THE NWS ARGUE TOO STRONGLY THAT PNE'S ARE NOT USEFUL, THEN THE NNWS WILL INSIST ON DEVELOPING THEIR OWN CAPACITY IN THIS AREA.

3. ROTH NOTED THAT IT WAS DIFFICULT FOR THE FRG TO REACH AN INDEPENDENT JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE UTILITY OF PNE'S. GERMAN EXPERTS DECIDED IN LATE 1960'S THAT PNE'S COULD NOT BE USED IN FRG. HE ALSO UNDERSTOOD THAT THE STATE OF THE ART DID NOT YET PERMIT DEVELOPMENT OF PNE'S ACCEPTABLE FOR ALL PURPOSES. FURTHERMORE, THE THREE NPT DEPOSITORY GOVERNMENTS SEEMED TO HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS. THE UK REFUSED TO INVEST IN THE TECHNOLOGY. THE USSR WAS STILL INTERESTED AND TESTING DEVICES. THE US SEEMED TO TAKE INCONSISTENT POSITIONS AND TO OFFER "CONTROVERSIAL" ARGUMENTS.

4. ROTH BELIEVED THAT ACDA OPPOSED FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF PNE'S. THE PLOWSHARE PROGRAM WAS ESSENTIALLY DEAD. YET THE AEC/ERDA AND THE LAWRENCE LIVERMORE LABORATORY (LLL) WERE HELPING THE KREDITANSTALT FUER WIEDERAUFBAU (KFW) IN A FEASIBILITY STUDY ABOUT THE USE

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OF PNE'S IN THE QATTARA DEPRESSION PROJECT IN EGYPT.

5. ROTH IMPLIED THAT THE FONOFF WOULD LIKE TO STOP THIS QATTARA PROJECT STUDY BUT COULD NOT DO SO WITHOUT GIVING REASONS. THE GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORIZATION TO DO THE STUDY CONTAINS AN "ESCAPE CLAUSE", I.E. THE FINAL DECISION ABOUT THE PROJECT AND THE TECHNOLOGY TO BE USED WILL DEPEND ON BOTH ECONOMICS AND THE RISK INVOLVED.

THE FRG HAS URGED KFW TO DEVELOP THE FIRST ROUGH COST ESTIMATE VERY CAREFULLY AND IN CLOSE COOPERATION WITH US AUTHORITIES. ROTH UNDERSTANDS THAT LLL AND KFW BELIEVE THAT 105 NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS WOULD BE NEEDED TO CONSTRUCT THE 72 KILOMETER QATTARA CANAL. SIXTY-FOUR OF THESE NUCLEAR DEVICES WOULD REQUIRE A YIELD OF

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OES-03 SS-15 USIA-06 SAJ-01 FEAE-00 /115 W

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R 181722Z FEB 75

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 02 BONN 02753

1.5 MEGATONS. REPORTEDLY, LLL HAS SAID THAT DEVELOPMENT OF A SUITABLE 1.5 MT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE WOULD REQUIRE TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS; THAT THE AEC/ERDA WOULD NOT FINANCE THE DEVELOPMENT; AND THAT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL WOULD BE NECESSARY.

6. HOWEVER, PUBLICATIONS BY THE LLL SEEM TO GIVE A MORE OPTIMISTIC PICTURE. LLL HAS REPORTED SOVIET CONCLUSIONS THAT NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES WOULD COST ONLY ONE-THIRD OF CONVENTIONAL EXCAVATION TECHNIQUES. ONE LLL REPORT IMPLIES THAT THE USSR MAY HAVE THE BEST DATA ON THIS POINT. ANOTHER LLL REPORT FAVORABLY

REVIEWS THE POSSIBILITY OF DIGGING A CANAL IN THAILAND WITH PNE'S. THIS OPTIMISM FROM US SOURCES MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR THE FRG TO GUIDE THE KFW AND INCREASES THE PRESSURE FOR A PROMPT INTERNATIONAL SOLUTION TO THE PNE QUESTION IN COMPLIANCE WITH THE NPT.

7. ROTH CONCLUDED HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION WITH A CONFIDENTIAL

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"PRIVATE" VIEW. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE "INCONSISTENCIES AND UNCERTAINTIES" DISPLAYED BY THE USG WITH RESPECT TO PNE POLICY COULD LEAD "SOME CIRCLES" TO DOUBT THE SINCERITY OF US INITIATIVES SEEKING INTERNATIONAL CONTROLS ON EXPORT OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR TECHNOLOGY. HE EMPHASIZED THAT THIS WAS A PERSONAL CONCLUSION AND ONE HE WAS RELUCTANT TO DRAW.

8. EMBASSY COMMENT: WE DREW ON REFTELS B-G TO RESPOND. WE ASSURED ROTH THAT USG CONSIDERED IT IMPORTANT TO REDUCE THE CREDIBILITY OF THE ARGUMENT THAT FAILURE TO IMPLEMENT NPT ARTICLE V JUSTIFIED ACQUISITION OF PNE TECHNOLOGY BY NNWS. IN VIEW OF THE STATE OF THE ART (REF E) AND THE QUESTIONS YET TO BE RESOLVED, THE USG WAS MOVING AS RAPIDLY AS POSSIBLE. THE US SUPPORTED, IN PRINCIPLE, THE UK PROPOSAL FOR A PNE COMMITTEE IN IAEA AND WAS ACTIVELY CONSULTING WITH THE UK. WE ALSO CALLED TO ROTH'S ATTENTION, THE REF G LETTER WHICH BRIEFED OUR NATO ALLIES ABOUT RELEVANT NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE USSR. WITH RESPECT TO THE QATTARA DEPRESSION PROJECT, WE RECALLED THE US POSITION OUTLINED IN REF D AND ASSURED ROTH THAT THIS STATEMENT (DISCUSSED WITH FONOFF OFFICIALS IN AUGUST 1973, SEE REF H) WAS STILL VALID. WE EMPHASIZED, IN PARTICULAR, THAT THE USG HAS NOT IN ANY WAY COMMITTED ITSELF TO ASSIST THE ACTUAL PROJECT. STUDIES OF THE FEASIBILITY OF PNE'S WERE IN PROGRESS AND WE WOULD CONTINUE TO SHARE THESE DATA WITH THE FRG AND IN APPROPRIATE INTERNATIONAL MEETINGS. IN GENERAL, HOWEVER, MORE R&D WILL BE NEEDED BEFORE IT IS POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE UTILITY OF PNE'S. ROTH APPRECIATED THE OPPORTUNITY TO DISCUSS THESE POINTS. HE HOPES TO CONTINUE THESE DISCUSSIONS IN WASHINGTON DURING HIS FEB. 24-27 VISIT. ARRANGEMENTS ARE BEING MADE BY FRG WASHINGTON EMBASSY.

9. NOTE: REF I, WHICH DIRECTED EMBASSY NOT TO DISCUSS REF D WITH THE FRG, WAS NOT RECEIVED UNTIL FEB. 15. IN REVIEWING REF D POINTS WITH ROTH, HOWEVER, WE DID CALL ATTENTION TO FACT THAT POINT CONTAINED PARA 2 (F)

WHICH HAD BEEN DISCUSSED IN AUGUST 1973, WAS NO
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LONGER RELEVANT.
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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: AGREEMENTS, NPT, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, NUCLEAR WEAPONS, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 18 FEB 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: ellisoob
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975BONN02753
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750057-0940
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750236/aaaabgla.tel
Line Count: 232
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 75 BONN 02153, 75 STATE 033966, 75 STATE 237038
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: ellisoob
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 31 MAR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <31 MAR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <16 SEP 2003 by ellisoob>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: GERMAN VIEWS ABOUT PNE'S
TAGS: PARM, TECH, GE
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006